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Abstract
How should a rational monopolist respond to boundedly rational con-
sumers? This paper looks at the inter-temporal price discrimination game
that arises when a monopolist faces naive-time-inconsistent consumers. En
route to solving this game, we introduce two new solution concepts for
dynamic games where some players are time inconsistent. The ﬁrst solu-
tion concept is similar in spirit to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
whereas the second one relies on backwards induction. Unlike in stan-
dard ﬁnite games, these solution concepts are not equivalent, even with
perfect information. We then use these solution concepts to solve the
inter-temporal pricing game with time inconsistent consumers. We derive
implications for monopoly proﬁts, consumer welfare and the path of prices
(Coase conjecture). We conclude that the existence of time inconsistency
will reduce monopoly proﬁts and the welfare of all consumers, except of
the highest valuation ones. Moreover, with time inconsistent consumers
the path of prices will approach marginal cost, but at a lower rate.
11 Introduction
How should a rational ﬁrm respond to boundedly rational consumers? This paper
asks, and then answers, this question in the context of a durable good monopoly
in the presence of time inconsistent consumers. We embed partially naive-time-
inconsistent consumers in a standard durable goods monopoly and we explore
the implications of time inconsistency for monopoly proﬁts, consumer welfare,
the path of prices and the Coase conjecture.
Motivation
Consider a standard durable good monopoly problem, as, for example, in Gul,
Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986). Typically, both in previous theoretical work and
in the real world, the monopolist does not observe the valuation of any individual
consumer and, as a result, he can not perfectly price discriminate. However, he
knows the distribution of the consumer valuations, thus he can use inter-temporal
price discrimination as a screening mechanism. The monopolist’s inter-temporal
price discrimination problem can be modelled as a game, between the monopolist
and the consumers. The monopolist chooses current and future prices, whereas
the consumers choose whether to buy now or in some future period, based on the
current price and their expectations about future prices.
It can be shown that in equilibrium the monopolist initially charges some
relatively high price to attract the higher valuation consumers, for whom it is
very costly to wait and buy at lower prices in future periods. With the higher
valuation consumers out of the market, the monopolist follows a similar strategy
with the remaining consumers. Therefore, as time goes by prices fall and asymp-
tote marginal cost. As the length of each period becomes smaller, price falls to
marginal cost (almost) immediately and the Coase conjecture is veriﬁed.
To make the inter-temporal pricing problem more realistic, we want to allow
for the possibility that consumers have time inconsistent preferences. Time in-
consistency is a consequence of the following fact about human cognition: the
discount factor for adjacent periods is lower for the immediate future than for
the more distant one. In other words, people feel that in the future they will
be more patient than they are today. Recall that in the standard case of ex-
ponential/geometric discounting, the discount factor is the same for all adjacent
periods. This implies that if at time t, a decision maker prefers alternative A
to alternative B, she will maintain a preference for alternative A at all future
periods as well. On the contrary, when a decision maker mistakenly thinks that
in the future she will be more patient, (i.e. her discount factor will be higher), it
is possible that in period t she prefers alternative A to alternative B, but reverses
her preference in some future period t+k. Hence the term time inconsistency. 1
1For example, the majority of us would prefer “1000 euros today” to “1020 euros in two
2The psychological evidence supporting such preference reversals is overwhelming
(see for example Ainslie (1992)), and it is fairly uncontroversial to claim that time
inconsistent preferences are a fact of life that economic theory should address.
What is more controversial is the issue of whether people are aware of their
time inconsistency. Strotz (1956) recognized that there can be two polar cases.
On one extreme, people may be sophisticated about their time inconsistency,
which means that even though they feel that in the future they will be more
patient, they do recognize that once the future rolls over they will be less pa-
tient. On the other extreme, people may be naive about their time inconsistency,
in which case they do not foresee that in the future they will not be as pa-
tient as they think they will be. Of course, there is also the intermediate range
of partially-naive consumers. Della Vigna and Malmandier (2003) use data on
gym memberships and attendance to test whether consumers are sophisticated
or naive-time-inconsistent. They conclude in favor of partially naive consumers.
We allow for both sophisticated and partially naive consumers, but as we shall
see the problem is non-trivial only with partially-naive consumers.2
A wide range of questions then arises. How should a rational monopolist price
in the presence of time inconsistent consumers? What are the implications of time
inconsistency for monopoly proﬁts, consumer welfare and the Coase conjecture?
And, how do our answers depend on whether we assume sophisticated versus
naive-time-inconsistent consumers?
Some game theory and the main results
In the presence of naive-time-inconsistent consumers, the core of the problem
is to ﬁgure out an appropriate solution concept that applies to games with time
inconsistent players. The seminal papers on time inconsistency of Strotz (1956)
and Phelps and Pollak (1968), as well as the more recent contributions of Laibson
(1997) and O’Donaghue and Rabin (1999, 2001), solve single-agent decision prob-
lems. However, there is no previous work that addresses time inconsistency in the
context of a non-cooperative game. Our paper proposes two solution concepts
for games with time inconsistent players and then applies them to the durable
goods monopoly.
When agents are naive-time-inconsistent, they make mistakes in predicting
their future behavior; in period t they think that in period t+1 they will choose
alternative A, only to discover that when period t+1 rolls over they choose some
other alternative B. When such agents (consumers) play a game, this means they
weeks”, but we would reverse this preference if we were given the choice between “1000 euros
in exactly one year from today” and “1020 in exactly one year and two weeks from today”.
2Our model is cast in the context of fully naive consumers, but, as we shall see, a simple
reinterpretation of the parameters handles any intermediate degree of naivete.
3also make mistakes in predicting how others (the monopolist) will behave. This
is because in period t they think that the monopolist will play a best response
to alternative A, but in fact he will play a best response to alternative B. In
the context of our pricing game, this means that time inconsistent consumers
make two types of mistakes. First, they do not correctly predict when they
will buy the good. Second, and this is a consequence of the ﬁrst, they cannot
correctly anticipate future prices. These observations open up two possibilities
for a solution concept.
One possibility is to require that consumers play a best response to the prices
that the rational monopolist will actually charge. This is “as if” when the market
opens in period 1, the monopolist announces all future prices and in each period
consumers decide when to buy based on these prices. Consumers take these
prices as given and they do not question how and why the monopolist has chosen
these prices. In turn, these prices are optimal for the monopolist given how the
consumers will actually behave. This is an equilibrium in the usual sense; players
are endowed with some beliefs about how others play and when players play a
best response to these beliefs the original beliefs are veriﬁed. We also impose the
restriction that the monopolist is sequentially rational, which guarantees that the
optimal pricing policy is subgame perfect. We refer to this solution concept as the
equilibrium and we argue it is related to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE).
The other possibility is to require that consumers play a best response to the
prices that they think the monopolist will choose. Consumers arrive at their ex-
pectations about future prices by introspection, i.e. by backwards induction. We
refer to the prediction that survives this introspective process as naive backwards
induction.
When consumers are sophisticated about their time inconsistency, what hap-
pens in the game coincides with what consumers think will happen and the two
solution concepts are equivalent. The ﬁrst result of the paper shows that for
sophisticated consumers the solution also coincides with the solution to the case
where consumers are time consistent.3. When consumers are (partially) naive,
the equilibrium and naive backwards induction lead to diﬀerent predictions. We
ﬁrst develop the main results in the context of the 3-period model and we then
extend to the general T-period model.
It is shown that in the equilibrium, as the degree of time inconsistency rises,
monopoly proﬁts and consumer welfare fall for all consumers, except for the
high valuation ones. Prices fall over time and approach marginal cost, but at
3This result, according to which sophisticated time inconsistency is equivalent to time con-
sistency, is true only in our pricing game and does not hold for general games
4a lower rate, relative to the time consistent case. To get an idea about the
forces that drive these results, notice that as time inconsistency becomes more
pronounced consumers think that they will be more patient in the future. As
a result, consumers become more reluctant to buy early when the price is high
and fewer people buy at a high price. This hurts the monopolist’s proﬁts and to
mitigate the negative eﬀect the monopolist has to lower his price in the ﬁrst period
in order to attract some consumers to buy early. In the subgame that follows,
there are more potential consumers, since fewer bought in the ﬁrst period, and
this enables the monopolist to increase his prices. The only consumers that gain
are the highest valuation ones that buy in the now lower ﬁrst period price.
The above results come with a caveat. If the degree of time inconsistency is
not high enough, then the equilibrium with time inconsistent consumers coincides
with the equilibrium of the time consistent case. Therefore, if we adopt the equi-
librium as the appropriate solution concept, naive time inconsistency has an eﬀect
on the outcome of the game only when the degree of time inconsistency is above
some threshold. For the 3-period model, we provide a closed form expression for
this threshold, in terms of the model’s parameters.
Under naive backwards induction we obtain similar qualitative results, but the
intuition is diﬀerent. Now, the driving force for the results is consumer expecta-
tions about future prices. It turns out that as the degree of time inconsistency
rises, consumers think that the second period price will be lower. As a result,
consumers become more reluctant to buy early at a high price. This triggers
the same eﬀects as the ones obtained under the equilibrium. Monopoly prof-
its fall, prices approach marginal cost at a lower pace and welfare falls for all
but the highest valuation consumers. These results hold for any degree of time
inconsistency.
Related Literature
This paper builds on four strands of literature; the durable good monopoly,
time inconsistent preferences, psychology and economics and the game theoretic
literature on solution concepts.
Any mention of the durable good monopoly usually goes hand in hand with
the Coase conjecture (1972), according to which durability robs the monopolist
of his market power because price falls (almost) immediately to marginal cost. In
the 1980’s a series of papers proved that Coase’s conjecture was indeed correct as
a limit result, as the length of a period becomes arbitrarily small. See for example,
Stokey (1981) and Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986). Besanko and Winston
(1990) solve for the subgame perfect optimal pricing policy for the special case
where consumer valuations are uniformly distributed. Waldman (2003) provides a
broad survey of the literature on the durable good monopoly, which also includes
5issues of optimal durability and adverse selection. Notice that the durable-good-
monopoly literature pertaining to the Coase conjecture is often recognized by the
term time inconsistency. However, this terminology refers to the monopolist’s
inability to commit to future prices and should not be confused with the time
inconsistency in our paper, which refers to how consumers discount future gains
from trade.
The literature on time inconsistent preferences has its origins in Strotz (1956)
and Phelps and Pollak (1968). Strotz (1956) was also the ﬁrst to observe the
distinction between sophisticated and naive time inconsistency. Phelps and Pol-
lak (1968) proposed a mathematically convenient way to model time inconsis-
tent preferences using a quasi-hyperbolic discount function, referred to as ¯ ¡ ±.
Laibson (1997) and O’Donaghue and Rabin (1999, 2001) have popularized this
quasi-hyperbolic discount function and explored some implications of time incon-
sistency for single person saving and task completion decisions. O’Donaghue and
Rabin (1999, 2001) have also explored some implications of assuming sophistica-
tion, naivete or partial naivete.
Time inconsistency is only one of a long list of psychologically- motivated chal-
lenges to the neoclassical paradigm. See Rabin (1998) for a survey of psychological
biases that are relevant for economic theory, such as overconﬁdence, framing ef-
fects, etc. The overwhelming majority of the early literature on psychology and
economics has focused on showing how a theory of bounded rationality based on
such psychological biases can explain various economic anomalies. Thaler (1991)
oﬀers a collection of articles on this topic. Recently, however, there has been a
growing interest in understanding how the existence of bounded rational agents in
a market setting aﬀects the welfare and the decisions of rational agents. Saraﬁdis
(2003) asks how a rational agent (politician/employee/advertiser) can exploit the
memories of his forgetful assessor (electorate/employer/consumers). Della Vigna
and Malmandier (2003) solve the two tariﬀ problem of a monopolist (gym club)
facing time inconsistent consumers. Gabaix and Laibson (2004) argue that ra-
tional ﬁrms can exploit boundedly rational consumers by making their product
ineﬃciently complex. The present paper is most similar in spirit with these last
three contributions.
Finally, the solution concepts of equilibrium and naive backwards induction
are motivated by the standard notions of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
due to Selten (1965), and backwards induction. Moreover, the concept of ratio-
nalizability in extensive form games, introduced by Berheim (1984) and Pearce
(1984), is useful in understanding the relative pros and cons of our solution con-
cepts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we take a quick
6look at a standard durable good monopoly problem to which we introduce time
inconsistent consumers. In section 3, we propose the two solution concepts of
equilibrium and naive backwards induction. Section 4 uses these solution con-
cepts to solve the inter-temporal pricing game and to derive implications for the
eﬀect of time inconsistency on proﬁts, prices and welfare. Section 5 considers the
arguments for and against each solution concept. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a monopolist selling a durable good to a population of consumers. Each
consumer can buy at most one unit of the good and let v denote a generic con-
sumer valuation for this one unit. The monopolist can not observe the valuation
of any individual consumer, but knows that consumer valuations in the popula-
tion are uniformly distributed between 0 and x, so that v » U[0;x]. As a result,
the monopolist can not perfectly price discriminate, but he can screen costumers
with inter-temporal price discrimination.
Let there be T periods, indexed by t 2 f1;2;:::;Tg, and assume that the
monopolist can commit to a price for the duration of a period t. The monopolist’s
inter-temporal pricing problem consists of choosing a price in each period t, with
the objective of maximizing his future stream of proﬁts. We assume that the
monopolist discounts future proﬁts at rate ° < 1, and, for simplicity we let
marginal cost be zero.
2.1 Price discrimination with time consistent consumers
Consider ﬁrst the case where consumers have an exponential/geometric discount
factor ± < 1. Besanko and Winston (1990) show how the monopolists’ inter-
temporal pricing problem can be solved backwards using dynamic programming.
Their solution is the benchmark to which we compare our subsequent results
with time inconsistency and, in what follows, we give a brief overview of the
Besanko-Winston solution.
First, observe that for any expected future prices, if a consumer with valuation
v
0 buys in a given period, so will any consumer with valuation v > v
0. Let vt
denote the lowest valuation consumer who buys in period t. Then in period t,
the state of the market is summarized by the state variable vt¡1, which indicates
that from period t onwards the monopolist faces consumers whose valuations are
uniformly distributed on the interval [0;vt¡1].
In each period t, the monopolist chooses the price pt that maximizes his
discounted stream of proﬁts from that period onwards, as a function of the state
7variable vt¡1. Let Πt(vt¡1) denote the maximum proﬁt that can be attained from




(vt¡1 ¡ vt)pt + °Πt+1(vt) (1)
subject to vt ¡ pt = ±(vt ¡ pt+1(vt)) (2)
The ﬁrst equation is the usual value function of the dynamic program. The
second equation says that the last consumer who buys in period t, and whose
valuation is deﬁned as vt, is exactly indiﬀerent between buying in period t or in
the next, t + 1, period. We will refer to this consumer as the marginal consumer
for period t. For future reference, it is important to understand why the state
variable vt is deﬁned by an indiﬀerence condition between periods t and t + 1,
rather than an indiﬀerence condition between periods t and some other future
period, say t + 2. To see this consider the following argument. In period t + 1
the marginal consumer is vt+1 and to be such she has to (weakly) prefer to buy
in period t+1 than in any future period, including the period t+2. This implies
that every consumer with valuation higher than vt+1 will strictly prefer to buy
in period t + 1 than in any future period, including period t + 2. Therefore, the
marginal consumer in period t who has valuation vt > vt+1 will strictly prefer to
buy in period t than in period t+2. Therefore, the marginal consumer in period
t can not be indiﬀerent between buying in the current period t or in some future
period t + k, where k > 1.
Besanko and Winston (1990) show that in the optimal pricing proﬁle the price
falls over time and they compute the rate at which this occurs. Such decreasing
pricing policy is referred to as price skimming, because it allows the monopolist
to screen consumers and charge a higher price to consumers with higher valua-
tions. As the number of periods goes to inﬁnity, the last period price asymptotes
marginal cost. Moreover, as the physical duration of a period becomes arbitrarily
small, price falls to marginal cost almost immediately. This insight is referred to
as the Coase conjecture, after Coase (1972) who argued that durability of a good
robs the monopolist of his market power.
The solution of Besanko and Winston (1990) can also be thought of as the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (or alternatively, the backwards induction out-
come) of a game that the monopolist plays with the consumers. The monopolist’s
strategy is to choose a stream of T prices, one for each period. The consumers
see the price in period t, pt, and their strategy is to decide whether or not to
buy (provided they have not already done so) based on what expectations they
have about future prices. In the SPNE (or the backwards induction outcome) the
8monopolist’s equilibrium strategy is to oﬀer the good at the prices that solve the
dynamic program in equations (1) and (2). The consumers’ equilibrium strategy
is to buy the good in period t, if their valuation is at least as high as vt. The
consumer with valuation exactly equal to vt is the marginal consumer for period
t.
Notice that same pricing policy would also solve the incomplete information
variant of the game, where the monopolist faces a single consumer whose valu-
ation v is private information, but distributed as v » U[0;x]. In this case, the
appropriate equilibrium concept is the perfect bayesian equilibrium (PBE). The
equilibrium strategies in the PBE are the same, as in the SPNE of the com-
plete information game. These strategies support the posterior beliefs that, if the
consumer has not bought at the end of period t, her valuation is distributed as
v » U[0;vt]. (see for example exercise 9.C.3 in Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green
(1995))
For future reference, we conclude our discussion with the solution to the two
period model, i.e. T = 2. It is straightforward to calculate the following prices









(4 ¡ 2± ¡ °)
(4)




2.2 Price discrimination with time inconsistent consumers
We now introduce time inconsistency in the benchmark model. For simplicity,
suppose that there are only three periods.
We assume that in period 1 consumers feel that between periods 2 and 3 they
will be more patient than they will actually be. To model such preferences, we
introduce two discount factors for the consumers, ± and ±
0. We refer to them
as the true and the perceived discount factor, respectively. The true discount
factor ± captures, how in period 1 consumers discount payoﬀs realized in period
2 and how in period 2 consumers discount payoﬀs realized in period 3. The
perceived discount factor ±
0 captures how in period 1 consumers expect to discount
period 3 payoﬀs in period 2. In other words, in period 1 the discount function
is f1;±;±±
0g, whereas in period 2 onwards the discount function is f1;±g. With
such preferences, it is possible that in period 1 a consumer expresses a desire to
buy in period 2 at price p2 rather than in period 3 at price p3, but when period 2
9rolls over she reverses her original preference. Hence, we say that consumers will
be time inconsistent.
Moreover, we assume that consumers are naive about their time inconsistency.
That is, in period 1 they do no understand that when period 2 comes they will
not be as patient as they think they will be. Alternatively, we could have assumed
that consumers are sophisticated about their time inconsistency, in which case,
in period 1 they feel that between periods 2 and 3 they will be more patient than
they are today, but they also realize that when period 2 actually rolls over they
will not be as patient as they feel they will be. As we shall later see (proposition
1), an attractive feature of our model is that it can also encompass the case where
consumers are partially sophisticated about their time inconsistency.
The monopolist is assumed to be perfectly rational; he is time consistent with
discount factor °, he knows that the consumers think that they will be more
patient in the future and he is aware that consumers will not be as patient as
they think they will be. Consumers, being naive, do not know that the monopolist
knows that they will not be as patient as they think they will be. As a result,
we have neither common knowledge of rationality nor common knowledge of
irrationality.
The economic literature commonly models time inconsistent preferences with
a quasi-hyperbolic discount function of the form f1;¯±;¯±2;:::g. Such preferences
are due to Phelps and Pollak (1968) and are referred to as (¯¡±) preferences. Our
model formulation is equivalent to the one implied by the (¯¡±) discount function.
To see this, notice that our true discount factor ± translates to the term ¯± in
the Phelps-Pollak formulation. And similarly, our perceived discount factor ±
0
translates to the parameter ± of Phelps-Pollak. We chosen not to use the original
Phelps-Pollak formulation because one of our goals in this paper is to explore how
they degree of time inconsistency aﬀects prices, proﬁts and consumer welfare. In
the ¯ ¡ ± model, the degree of time inconsistency is captured by the parameter
¯. As the parameter ¯ falls, the degree of time inconsistent rises. At the same
time, however, a decrease in the parameter ¯ also makes the decision maker less
patient, because it decreases the discount factor ¯± that the decision maker uses
for discounting two adjacent periods, say periods 1 and 2. In our formulation
the degree of time inconsistency is captured by the perceived discount factor ±
0.
As the perceived discount factor ±
0 increases, the degree of time inconsistency
increases, but this does not aﬀect the true discount factor between periods 1 and
2. In other words, our formulation allows us to disentangle the eﬀect of increased
time inconsistency from increased impatience.
What is the optimal pricing strategy for the monopolist in the presence of
naive-time-inconsistent consumers? And what are the implications of time in-
consistency for monopoly proﬁts, consumer welfare and the Coase conjecture?
10To answer these questions it is ﬁrst necessary to deﬁne a solution concept for dy-
namic games where some players are naive-time-inconsistent. In the next section
we propose two ways to solve such games.
3 Solution concepts
In this section, we propose two solution concepts for dynamic games where one
player is rational and the rest are naive-time-inconsistent. Our objective here is to
simply present two “sensible” ways to solve such games. We will then apply these
two new solution concepts to our motivating inter-temporal pricing problem. We
do not have here neither the intention nor the space to discuss technical issues
of, say, existence or the epistemic foundations of these solution concepts. Such
issues are explored in a companion paper, Saraﬁdis (2004).4
Consider the following game, whose extensive form is depicted in ﬁgure 1.
Player B (for Boundedly rational) moves ﬁrst in period 1 and she can play in
or out.5 If she plays out, the game ends, but players have to wait until the end
of period 3 before they receive their payoﬀs.6 If player B plays in, player R
(Rational) gets to play Left or Right, still in period 1. Then in period 2, player
B gets to play left or right. The game ends in period 2, but in case player B
plays right, she has to wait an extra period, before she gets her payoﬀ of 10 or 8.
Moreover, assume that player B is time inconsistent in the following sense.
In period 1, she thinks that in period 2 she will prefer “10 in period 3” to “9 in
period 2” and that she will prefer “8 in period 3” to “7 in period 2”. However,
in period 2 she reverses her preference and she goes for the lower, but immediate
payoﬀs of 9 and 7, respectively. In other words she thinks that she will be patient,
but in reality she will be impatient. Moreover, we assume that in period 1 player
B is not aware that she will actually not be patient in period 2, and hence she
is naive about her time inconsistency. Player R is assumed to be rational; he is
time consistent, and he knows that player B is naive-time-inconsistent. Finally,
player B, being naive about her time inconsistency, does not know that player R
knows that player B will not be as patient as she thinks she will be.
4Also, at this stage our objective is not to compare these two solution concepts and ask
which one is “better”. There are pros and cons for both solution concepts and we believe that
the appropriateness of using one over the other depends on the particular economic application
we have in mind. We postpone a comparison between our two solution concepts for later, after
we have seen how they perform “in practise”, in solving the motivating pricing problem. (see
section 5)
5Player B (resp. R) is the female (resp. male) player.
6The asterisk next to the payoﬀs in ﬁgure 1 indicates that these payoﬀ will be realized at
the end of period 3. All other payoﬀs are obtained at the end of period 2.
11How would you play this game if you were player B? What if you were player
R? In period 1 player B could reason as follows. “If I play out I will get 9*.
If instead I play in, then if player R plays Left I will play right and get 10*,
whereas if player R plays Right I will play right and get 8*. Therefore, I should
play in only if I think that player R will play Left. To determine what player R
will play, I should put myself in his shoes and reason about the problem from his
perspective. Player R will think that if he plays Left, I will play right and he
will end up with nothing. If instead he plays Right, he will think that I will play
right and he will get 1. Therefore, he will play Right and I should play out.”
The reader has probably recognized that the reasoning of player B in the
preceding paragraph is a form of backwards induction. According to it, player
B will play out, because she expects that if she instead plays in, player R will
play Right and then she will play right. This play path is portrayed with the
dotted lines in the ﬁgure and it describes what player B thinks will happen. We
will refer to this prediction for the game as naive backwards induction (NBI) and
we will formalize it shortly. We have added the qualiﬁer naive to emphasize that
under NBI player B plays a best response to what she naively thinks player R
will play.
Here is another sensible prediction about how the game will be played. Assume
that player R announces that he will play Left and player B does not worry
about how player R has come to the conclusion that he should play Left. Now,
in period 1 player B reasons as follows. “If I play out I get 9*. If I play in, player
R will play Left, because he said so. I will then play right and my payoﬀ will
be 10*. Therefore, my best response to his announcement is to play in, and then
right”. As the game develops and player B plays in, player R plays Left and
then player B plays left. Notice that player R, knowing that player B will be
impatient, will indeed ﬁnd it optimal to play Left, as he announced. Our new
prediction for the game is ((in;left);Left). We will refer to this solution concept
as the “equilibrium” and we will formalize it shortly. We have chosen the term
equilibrium to highlight the similarity of this solution concept to the standard
notion of the Nash equilibrium. As in a Nash equilibrium, players are endowed
with some beliefs about how others will play. Each player takes these beliefs as
given, without questioning how and why other players have chosen to play this
way, and chooses a best response. Moreover, the original beliefs are conﬁrmed in
equilibrium, because all players actually play as others expect them to play.
It is well known that in dynamic games the Nash equilibrium allows players to
take actions that are not sequentially rational. To overcome this problem, we have
the equilibrium reﬁnement of subgame perfection, due to Selten (1965). When
we will later deﬁne the equilibrium formally, we will also impose the requirement
of subgame perfection. For the time being, notice that the proposed equilibrium
12for our motivating example is indeed subgame perfect. Player R plays Left and
from his point of view this is indeed a sequentially rational move.
In our example, the equilibrium and NBI predict diﬀerent outcomes. In ﬁ-
nite games of perfect information with time consistent players the concepts of
backwards induction and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium are equivalent. Our
preceding motivating example shows that in games with time inconsistent play-
ers, it is possible to have an equilibrium which is subgame perfect, but fails to
survive (naive) backwards induction and the equivalence breaks down.
We can summarize the main features of our two solution concepts as follows.
In a NBI the time inconsistent player plays a best response to what he thinks
the rational player will play. The attractive feature of NBI is that players can
rationalize what they play with a speech of the form: “I play x, because I expect
my opponent to play y, because he expects that I play x
0, because I expect him
to play y
0,...”. However, the time inconsistent player will be surprised by how
the rational player plays the game, because player R may play contrary to the
expectations of player B. In an equilibrium the time inconsistent player plays a
best response to what the rational player actually plays. The attractive feature of
this concept is that the expectations that players have about how others play the
game are conﬁrmed in equilibrium. The downside is that the time inconsistent
player can not understand why the rational player plays the way he does. Section
5 provides a more detailed discussion of the relative pros and cons of each solution
concept.
Formalizing the solution concepts
We now formalize the two solution concepts. For notational convenience we
restrict attention to two-player games.
Let Γ be a ﬁnite dynamic two-player game of complete7 information that
lasts for T periods. There are two players, R and B. Player B is naive-time-
inconsistent. Player R is time consistent and he knows that player B is naive-
time-inconsistent.
We create T ¡1 new time consistent players from player B as follows. Player
Bi, for i = 1;2;:::;T has the preferences of the i-period self of player B and has
available the actions that player B has from period i onwards. For example,
applying this to our earlier game gives three players, namely B1, B2 and B3.
Player B1 has the preferences of the period 1 self and has available the following
strategies: (out;left;left), (out;left;right), (out;right;left), (out;right;right),
(in;left;left), (in;left;right), (in;right;left), (in;right;right). Player B2 has
7The same ideas can be modiﬁed to handle inﬁnitely repeated games and games of incomplete
information, see Saraﬁdis (2004).
13the preferences of the period 2 self and she prefers to play left rather than right at
both information sets. Her strategies are (left;left), (left;right), (right;left),
(right;right). Player B3 in this example is immaterial because the game ends
after period 2.
Let sR be a strategy for player R and sBi be a strategy for the ﬁctitious
player Bi. It will be useful to deﬁne strategy sB from each sBi as: the actual
strategy that player B will execute if each i-period incarnation, player Bi, plays
according to strategy sBi. For example, return to our example and let sB1 =
(in;left;left);sB2 = (right;left). Then, we can write sB = (in;right;left).
Another way to think of the strategy sB is to pretend that player B uses a
notebook to write down what she plans to do in the game. The notebook has T
pages and each page has T lines. On page 1 the ﬁctitious player B1 starts on line
1 and on each line i ¸ 1 she writes what she plans to do in period i. Then, on
page 2 the ﬁctitious player B2 starts on line 2 and on line i ¸ 2 she writes what
she plans to do in period i. And so on, for each ﬁctitious player Bi. Then, what
we call sB is the strategy that someone would play if she did what was written
down on line 1 of page 1, then line 2 of page 2, line 3 of page 3 and so on.
We can now formalize the two solution concepts.
Deﬁnition 1. A strategy proﬁle s = (sR;sB1;:::;sBT) is an equilibrium if:
1. strategy sR is a best response to sB for player R
2. strategy sBi is a best response to strategy sR for each player sBi
3. Proﬁle s induces an equilibrium in all subgames
Deﬁnition 2. A strategy proﬁle s = (sR;sB1;:::;sBT) survives naive backwards
induction if:
1. strategy sR is a best response to sB for player R
2. strategy sBi is the strategy of player Bi that survives the backwards induc-
tion procedure in the game between players R and Bi.
The preceding deﬁnitions highlight the diﬀerence between the two solution
concepts that we have already discussed. In an equilibrium the time inconsistent
player plays a best response to what the rational player will actually do. When
players play according to NBI the time inconsistent player plays a best response
to what she thinks the rational player will do. Finally notice that condition 3 in
the deﬁnition of an equilibrium imposes the restriction of subgame perfection.
144 Solving the model
We now apply the two solution concepts of equilibrium and NBI to the motivating
inter-temporal pricing problem. Recall that in an equilibrium (see deﬁnition 1)
the boundedly rational players play a best response to what the rational player
actually does. In our case, this means that in an equilibrium the consumers
decide when to buy based on the prices that the monopolist will actually charge.
This is “as if” in period 1 the monopolist announces a price for period 1 and
for all future periods.8 In contrast, with NBI the consumers decide when to buy
based on the future prices that they think the monopolist will charge. Consumers
calculate these future prices via backwards induction, without recognizing that
in the future they will not be as patient as they think they will be.
When consumers are sophisticated about their time inconsistency, the prices
that consumers expect coincide with the prices that the monopolist actually
charges. It is straightforward to conclude that the two solution concepts (equilib-
rium and naive backwards induction) are equivalent when consumers are sophis-
ticated. One can also show that with sophisticated consumers the equilibrium
to our pricing game coincides with the solution of Besanko and Winston (1990)
for time consistent consumers. In other words, the prices that solve the price
discrimination problem when consumers are time consistent with discount factor
±, also solve the problem when consumers are time inconsistent but sophisticated,
with true discount factor ±. We formalize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the price discrimination game with sophisticated time incon-
sistent consumers and true discount factor ±, both the equilibrium and the back-
wards induction outcome coincide with the SPNE of the game with time consis-
tent consumers and discount factor ±.
It is important to note that this equivalence between time consistency and
sophisticated time inconsistency is a feature particular to our pricing game and
does not hold in general. For a counterexample, revisit the game in ﬁgure 1 and
replace the payoﬀ to player B if she plays out to “10 in period 3”, rather than “9 in
period 3”. Consider ﬁrst the case where player B is time consistent and suppose
that she discounts future payoﬀs at ± = 1
2. Then, backwards induction predicts
the outcome ((in;left);Left). Now, assume that player B is time inconsistent.
In period 1 she discounts period 2 payoﬀs by ± and period 3 payoﬀs by ±±
0,
where ±
0 > ± and ±
0 close to 1. In period 2 she discount period 3 payoﬀs by ±.
With sophisticated time inconsistency, backwards induction predicts that player
B plays out.
8Condition 3 of deﬁnition 1 requires that these prices that the monopolist announces in
period 1 are also subgame perfect.
15As a corollary to proposition 1, one can see that by reinterpreting the param-
eters of our model we can also encompass the case of partially-naive consumers.
Suppose, for example, that the true discount rate is 0.9, but consumers feel that
in the future they will be more patient and their future discount factor will be
0.95. Moreover, assume that consumers realize that they will not be as patient as
they think they will be. However, being only partially aware of their time incon-
sistency they think that the future discount rate will be 0.92, still greater than the
true value of 0.9. Such partially naive consumers are equivalent to totally naive
consumers who think that the future discount factor will be 0.92. This is because,
as proposition 1 shows, that part of time inconsistency that the consumers are
aware of is immaterial.
4.1 Equilibrium
We now return to our motivating case of naive-time-inconsistent consumers and
we compute the equilibrium of the pricing game.
As we have seen, in an equilibrium the prices that consumers anticipate for
the future coincide with the ones that the monopolist will actually charge. One
candidate equilibrium is for the monopolist to announce the same path of prices,
(p1;p2;p3), as in the Besanko-Winston solution when the time consistent con-
sumers have discount factor ±. Let us now explore whether this path of prices
can be an equilibrium when consumers are naive-time-inconsistent.
We have already argued that with time consistent consumers in each period
t < 3 there is a marginal consumer with valuation vt who is exactly indiﬀerent
between buying in periods t or t + 1. If (p1;p2;p3) is the SPNE path of prices,
the indiﬀerence conditions for the marginal consumers are
v1 ¡ p1 = ±(v1 ¡ p2) (6)
v2 ¡ p2 = ±(v2 ¡ p3) (7)
Moreover, since v1 > v2, equations (6) and (7) imply that
v1 ¡ p1 > ±
2(v1 ¡ p3) (8)
which says that the marginal consumer from period 1 would strictly prefer to buy
in period 1 than in period 3.
When consumers are naive-time-inconsistent with true discount factor ± and
the path of prices is the same, (p1;p2;p3), in period 2 a consumer with valuation v2
is again the marginal consumer, as she is indiﬀerent between buying in periods 2
or 3. Also, in period 1 a consumer with valuation v1 is indiﬀerent between buying
16in periods 1 and 2. However, she may no longer strictly prefer to buy in period 1
(or 2) than in period 3, and therefore she will no longer be the marginal consumer.
This is because the discount factor between periods 1 and 3 is no longer ±2, but
±±
0. If the discount factor ±0 is close enough to ±, then a consumer with valuation
v1 will strictly prefer to buy in period 1 (or 2) than in in period 3, as before. On
the other extreme, if the perceived discount factor ±
0 is close to 1, then she will
prefer to buy in period 3. Therefore, as long as the time inconsistency is not very
pronounced, i.e. ±
0 is close to ±, the equilibrium with time consistent consumers
is also an equilibrium in the presence of naive-time-inconsistent consumers. We
formalize this in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let ± and ±
0 be the true and the perceived discount factors in
the price discrimination game with naive-time-inconsistent consumers. If the
perceived discount factor ±
0 is less than the threshold
4¡2°¡±2
6¡2°¡3±, then the SPNE
of the game with time consistent consumers and discount factor ± is also an
equilibrium in the game with naive-time-inconsistent consumers.
Straightforward diﬀerentiation shows that the threshold
4¡2°¡±2
6¡2°¡3± is increasing
in the discount factor ± and decreasing in the monopolist’s discount factor °. It
is also always greater than ± and less than 1.




6¡2°¡3±. In this case, the marginal consumer in period 1 is deﬁned by
an indiﬀerence condition between periods 1 and 3. Then, the period 1 equilibrium
price and marginal consumer, p1 and v1 respectively, solve the following program.
max
p1;v1
(x ¡ v1)p1 + °Π2(v1) (9)
subject to v1 ¡ p1 = ±±
0
(v1 ¡ p3(v1)) (10)
The expression Π2(v1) in equation (9) is the equilibrium proﬁt of the monop-
olist in the subgame that begins in period 2. The price p3 in (10) is the price that
the monopolist will choose in the subgame that starts in period 3. To see how
these are calculated, notice that in the subgame that begins in period 2 we have
only two periods left and, as a result, the time inconsistency will no longer mat-
ter. Therefore, the equilibrium prices and marginal consumers for periods 2 and
3 will coincide with those of the SPNE of the T = 2 game with time consistent









(4 ¡ 2± ¡ °)
(12)




Substituting these expressions into equations (9) and (10) and using the fact
that Π2(v1) =
v1
2 p2(v1) results to a standard two variable constrained maximiza-
tion problem. With Π1(x) we denote the value of the objective function at the
maximum. The expressions for the price p1 and the marginal consumer v1 that
solve the problem are too complicated to be of any practical use (see appendix).
Nevertheless, it is possible to prove qualitative results for the monopoly proﬁts
and the path of prices.
In particular we are interested in how the presence and the degree of time
inconsistency aﬀect monopoly proﬁts and the path of prices. In our model time
inconsistency enters through the perceived discount factor ±
0. The higher the
perceived discount factor ±
0 is, the more pronounced time inconsistent is. The
next result shows how the degree of time inconsistency aﬀects monopoly proﬁts.
Proposition 3. Let ±
0 >
4¡2°¡±2
6¡2°¡3±. The equilibrium monopoly proﬁts fall as the






Therefore, monopoly proﬁts are at their highest level when the monopolist
faces time consistent consumers, i.e. (±
0 = ±). The intuition for the result is as
follows. We know that in the time consistent case an increase in the discount
factor ± hurts the monopolist. This is because when the discount factor rises,
consumers become more patient and they prefer to wait and buy in the future
when prices will be lower. As the degree of time inconsistency rises, consumers
think that they will be more patient. Some consumers who would otherwise buy
in period 1 at a high price, postpone now their purchases in the expectation that
they will buy in period 3 and this hurts monopolist proﬁts. This is despite the
fact that once period 2 rolls over, some of these consumers will not wait until
period 3, but they will buy in period 2.
The next result shows how the degree of time inconsistency aﬀects the ﬁrst
period price, p1, and the valuation of the marginal consumer, v1.
Proposition 4. Let ±
0 >
4¡2°¡±2
6¡2°¡3±. The equilibrium ﬁrst period price falls as the de-





0 < 0). Moreover, the equilibrium valuation






0 > 0), and as a result fewer consumers buy in period 1.
To see the intuition, let vL
1 be the valuation of the marginal consumer in
equilibrium when the degree of time inconsistency ±
0 is at some relatively low
level. Assume now that the degree of time inconsistency, ±
0, rises to a higher
level. Now, consumers with valuations slightly higher than vL
1 no longer want to
buy in period 1. Instead, they prefer to wait and buy in period 3 when the price
is lower. In order to induce some of them to buy in period 1 the monopolist has
to decrease the price in period 1.
Finally, since fewer consumers buy in period 1 (v1 rises), by inspecting equa-
tions (11), (12) and (13) it is immediate to see that the period 2 and 3 prices, p2
and p3, as well as the valuations of the marginal consumers, v2 and v3 will rise
with the perceived discount factor ±
0. Intuitively, there are more potential buyers
in the subgame that starts in period 2 and this allows the monopolist to raise
prices in the last two periods.
To summarize, the key points of the preceding discussion have been that time
inconsistency hurts monopoly proﬁts and leads to a ﬂatter decline in the path of
prices over time, relative to the time consistent case.
4.2 Naive Backwards Induction
Next we explore the eﬀect of time inconsistency using the solution concept of
naive backwards induction.
Recall that in a NBI outcome players play a best response to what they
think other players will do. In the context of our pricing game, this means that
consumers time their purchases based on the current price and the prices that
they anticipate for the future. Consumers think that in the future they will be
more patient than they will actually be and they also think that the monopolist
thinks that they will be more patient. Therefore, the prices that the consumers
anticipate will not coincide with the prices that the monopolist will actually
charge.
To see how the game will unfold, let players play according to NBI. In period
1 there will be a marginal consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying in period
1 at price p1 or in period 2 at the anticipated period 2 price.9 To calculate this
anticipated future price for period 2 consumers will have to reason about the
subgame that begins in period 2 with v1 as the state of the market. On one
9An argument identical to the one we used for the time consistent case establishes that the
marginal consumer in period 1 is indiﬀerent between buying in periods 1 or 2, rather than
between periods 1 and 3.
19hand, being good game theorists, consumers will realize that the subgame will be
played according to equations (11)-(13). On the other hand, being naive about
their time inconsistent, consumers will incorrectly set the true discount factor
± in equations (11)-(13) equal to the perceived discount factor ±
0. Therefore,
consumers anticipate that the price in period 2 will be given by p2(v1;±
0) as












In period 1 the monopolist solves
max
p1;v1
(x ¡ v1)p1 + °Π2(v1) (15)
subject to v1 ¡ p1 = ±(v1 ¡ p2(v1;±
0
)) (16)
Equation (16) says that the marginal consumer is indiﬀerent between buying in
period 1 at the price p1 or buying in period 2 at the anticipated price p2(v1;±
0).
Being naive about her time inconsistency, the marginal consumer does not realize
that the price she anticipates will not correspond to the actual price that the
monopolist will charge in period 2. As before, Π2(v1) denotes the continuation
proﬁt in the subgame that begin in period 2 when the state of the market is
v1. Also, Π1(x) will denote the value of the period 1 objective function at the
maximum.
The price p1 and the marginal consumer v1 that solve the NBI problem will
be diﬀerent from the equilibrium ones, that we obtained solving (9) subject to
(10). Nevertheless, we obtain the same qualitative results for the eﬀect of time
inconsistency on the monopoly proﬁts and the path of prices.
Proposition 5. Under naive backwards induction, as the degree of time incon-
















0 > 0), and as a result fewer consumers buy in period 1.
The intuition for these results, however, is diﬀerent than before. Let vL
1 be
the valuation of the marginal consumer under NBI when the degree of time in-
consistency, ±
0, is at some relatively low level. Assume now that the degree of
time inconsistency, ±
0, rises. Straightforward diﬀerentiation of equation (11) with
respect to the discount factor ± shows that as the discount factor rises the sec-
ond period price falls (
dp2(v1)
d± < 0). Therefore, as the perceived discount factor
20±
0 increases, consumers think that the second period price will be lower. As a
result, consumers with valuations slightly higher than v1 will no longer want to
buy in period 1 and they would rather wait until period 2. In order to induce
some of them to buy now, the monopolist has to lower the price in period 1.
In other words, under NBI time inconsistency hurts the monopolist because it
leads consumers to anticipate a lower price in the second period. Contrast this
to our story when we solved for the equilibrium. There, time inconsistency hurts
the monopolist because consumers erroneously think that they will be patient in
period 2 and hence some of them think it is worthwhile to wait until period 3.
Another diﬀerence between equilibrium and NBI is that the time inconsistency
lowers the equilibrium monopoly proﬁts and the equilibrium price in period 1 only
as long as ±
0 >
4¡2°¡±2
6¡2°¡3±, i.e. when the degree of time inconsistency is high enough.
For example, if the discount factors for the monopolist and the consumers are
equal to 0.9, as long as the perceived discount factor stays below 0.9267, the
equilibrium of the time inconsistent case is unchanged and coincides with the
SPNE of the time consistent game. With naive backwards induction, the outcome
of the game will be diﬀerent from the time consistent one, even for the slightest
degree of time inconsistency.
To conclude the description of NBI, we need to see what happens in the
subgame that starts in period 2. When there are only two periods to go, time
inconsistency will not come into play and the subgame will unfold according
to equations (11)-(13). As time inconsistency becomes more pronounced, fewer
consumers buy in period 1 (v1 increases) and this enables the monopolist to raise
prices in periods 2 and 3.
To summarize, with NBI time inconsistency lowers monopoly proﬁts and the
price in period 1. It increases period 2 and 3 prices, p2 and p3, and the valuations
of the marginal consumers, v2;v3. Consequently, the path of prices is ﬂatter,
relative to the time consistent case.
An alternative NBI
So far, we assumed that it is common knowledge that the monopolist is time
consistent. A possible objection to this assumption is that, if consumers erro-
neously think that they, themselves, will be more patient in the future, they may
also erroneously think that the monopolist will also be more patient in the fu-
ture. In an equilibrium, it will not matter whether the consumers realize that the
monopolist is time inconsistent or not. However, with naive backwards induction
it will matter.
To see this, assume that it is common knowledge that the monopolist and the
consumers are, and will always be, equally patient. Let the true discount factor
for both be ± = °. If consumers erroneously think that in period 2 they will be
21more patient, they may also erroneously think that the monopolist will also be
more patient. If this is the case, in period 1 consumers will anticipate that the
price in period 2 will be given by p2(v1;±
0;±





















whereas the true period 2 price will be determined by the function p2(v1;±;°) as
in (11).10 The diﬀerence arises, because now consumers think that both they and
the monopolist will be more patient in the future. Consequently, the ﬁrst period
price, p1, and the valuation of the marginal consumer, v1, under NBI will now
solve (15) subject to














0) is a convex parabola that attains a minimum
at ±
0 = 2
3. This means that if we restrict attention to the case where both the
discount factors ± and ±
0 are greater than 2
3, an increase in the degree of time
inconsistency will increase the period 2 price that consumers anticipate. As a
result, in period 1 the monopolist can get away by charging a higher price which
increases his proﬁt. This leads to the following result.
Proposition 6. Suppose that the price that consumers anticipate for period 2
is increasing in the degree of time inconsistency. Then, under naive backwards
induction, as the degree of time inconsistency rises, monopoly proﬁts and the ﬁrst










0 > 0). Moreover, the valuation of the





0 < 0), and as a result more consumers
buy in period 1.
This is in contrast to what we saw earlier, where time inconsistency lowers
the price that consumers anticipate for period 2 and this leads the monopolist to
lower his period 1 price. Therefore, under NBI, the eﬀect of time inconsistency
on monopoly proﬁts and the path of prices will depend on how time inconsistency
aﬀects the price that consumers anticipate for period 2. When time inconsistency
causes consumers to anticipate a lower price in period 2, monopoly proﬁts fall
and the path of prices is ﬂatter. In the opposite case, monopoly proﬁts rise and
the path of prices is steeper, relative to the time consistent case.




We now explore the eﬀect of time inconsistency on consumer welfare.
In ﬁgure 2 we compare consumer welfare with and without time inconsistency.
The bottom axis shows the valuations of the marginal consumers in the SPNE
of the time consistent case, when the discount factor of the consumers and the
monopolist are equal to 0.9, i.e. ± = ° = 0:9. The upper axis shows the valuations
of the marginal consumers under NBI for the time inconsistent case where ± =
° = 0:9 and ±
0 = 0:99. As predicted by our earlier results, these valuations
are higher for the time inconsistent case. Had we solved for the equilibrium of
the game instead, these marginal valuations would have been diﬀerent, but they
would still be greater than the time consistent ones. Also, notice that the ﬁrst
period price is lower with time inconsistency. The opposite is true for the prices
in periods 2 and 3.
Figure 2 also depicts 7 regions (rectangles). Counting from left to right we
will refer to them as regions 1;2;:::;7. Region 6, for example, contains these
consumers who buy in period 1 in the time consistent case, but they buy in
period 2 in the time inconsistent case. Region 7 contains consumers who buy in
period 1 in both cases. And so on, for all other regions.
Evaluating the change in the welfare of consumers in regions 7, 5, 3, 2 and 1 is
straightforward. Consumers in region 7, with or without time inconsistency, buy
in period 1 and they are better oﬀ in the time inconsistent case, because they pay
a lower price. Consumers in region 5 (resp. 3) always buy in period 2 (resp. 3)
and time inconsistency makes them worse oﬀ, because they pay a higher price in
period 2 (3 resp.). Consumers in region 2 are worse oﬀ with time inconsistency,
because they no longer make a purchase. Finally, the lowest valuation consumers
in region 1, never make a purchase and the presence of time inconsistency leaves
them indiﬀerent.
Furthermore, in the time consistent case, consumers in region 6 prefer to buy
in period 1 than in period 2 at price p2. With time inconsistency, these consumers
buy in period 2 at some higher period 2 price. Therefore, time inconsistency leaves
them worse oﬀ. A similar argument shows that time inconsistency also reduces
the welfare of consumers in region 4.
We can conclude that time inconsistency reduces the welfare of all consumers,
except for the highest valuation ones. Moreover, in light of proposition 1, which
shows that the time consistent case is equivalent to the sophisticated time incon-
sistent case, we can rephrase our conclusion as follows: consumers’ unawareness
of their time inconsistency reduces the welfare of all, but the highest valuation,
consumers.11
11Earlier, we saw that time inconsistency also reduces the monopoly proﬁts. It would be
234.4 The T-period model
We conclude our description of the pricing game by looking at the general T-
period model. As we shall see, inductive versions of our previous arguments
generalize most of our earlier results.
We now assume that in every period t the discount factor between periods t
and t + 1 is ±. Furthermore, in every period t consumers think that from period
t + 1 onwards their discount factor will be ±
0 > ±, which means that consumers
erroneously think that they will be more patient in the future. Consequently, the
discount function from period t onwards evolves as f1;±;±±
0;±±
02;:::g.
Equilibrium in the T-period model
We ﬁrst describe the equilibrium of the T-period model. Recall that in an
equilibrium it is “as if” the monopolist announces the complete path of prices in
period 1 and the consumers make their purchasing decisions taking these prices
as given. One candidate equilibrium is for the monopolist to announce the same
prices that he would charge in the SPNE of the time consistent case with discount
factor ±. Recall that in the SPNE of the time consistent game, in each period T
there is a marginal consumer with valuation vt who is indiﬀerent between buying
in periods t or t+1. Moreover, time inconsistency guarantees that this marginal
consumer will strictly prefer to buy in periods t or t+1 than buy in some future
period, say t + 2. In period t, if a consumer is indiﬀerent between buying in
periods t or t+1 in the time consistent case, she would also be indiﬀerent in our
candidate equilibrium with time inconsistency. However, with time inconsistency
there is no guarantee that this consumer prefers to buy in periods t (or t + 1)
than wait and buy in some future period t+1+k and our candidate equilibrium
may break down. For example, in the extreme case where the perceived discount
factor is equal to 1 (i.e. consumers think that in the future they will be inﬁnitely
patient) a consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying in periods t and t+1, will
strictly prefer to wait until the last period T, when the price will be at its lowest
level.
Therefore, in an equilibrium the valuation of the marginal consumer in period
t may be deﬁned by an indiﬀerence condition between periods t and any future
period t + k, depending on the degree of time inconsistency. The complexity of
the T-period problem is such that it is not possible to ﬁnd conditions similar to
the one in proposition 2, that would tell us which indiﬀerence condition deﬁnes
the marginal consumers in all periods. However, we can generalize our previous
qualitative results from the 3-period model.
wrong to deduce that this implies that the overall consumer welfare increases, because the
game between the monopolist and the consumers is not zero sum.
24Proposition 7. In the T-period model the equilibrium monopoly proﬁts and the
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0 ¸ 0, and as a result fewer consumers buy in period 1.
The qualiﬁer “weakly” is needed because for low levels of time inconsistency,
the equilibrium coincides with the SPNE of the time consistent game. As in the
3-period model, consumers think that they will be more patient in the future
and this hurts the monopolist in the same way that that an increase in the true
discount factor ± hurts the monopolist in the time consistent case.
What about the eﬀect of time inconsistency on prices and the valuations of
marginal consumers in the subsequent subgames? There are two eﬀects. First,
since fewer people buy in period 1, the state of the market is higher in the
subsequent subgame and this will increase both the price and the valuation of
the marginal consumer in period 2. Second, keeping the state of the market ﬁxed,
proposition 7 implies, by induction, that in the subgame that starts in period 2,
time inconsistency will lower the second period price and increase the valuation of
the period 2 marginal consumer. As far as the valuation of the marginal consumer,
both of these eﬀects work in the same direction and the valuation of the period
2 marginal consumer increases as time inconsistency becomes more pronounced.
As far as the second period price, these eﬀects work in opposite directions and the
net eﬀect is ambiguous. Inductively, it is immediate to see that the valuations of
the marginal consumer in all periods will increase with time inconsistency. The
eﬀect of time inconsistency on the path of prices between periods 2 and T ¡ 2 is
ambiguous. It is possible, however, to predict the eﬀect of time inconsistency for
the price in the last two periods. In the subgame that starts in the penultimate
T ¡ 1 period, there are only two periods left and time inconsistency does not
matter anymore. As a result, the second of the eﬀects we described is absent and
both the T¡1 and T period prices will necessarily increase with time inconsistency
as in the 3-period model.
NBI in the T-period model
In the NBI case, we know that in each period t the marginal consumer is
indiﬀerent between buying in periods t at the current price or in period t+1 at the
price she anticipates for that period. Inductively, we can write the monopolist’s
problem in period t as
max
pt;vt
(vt¡1 ¡ vt)pt + °Πt+1(vt) (19)




t+1 is the price that consumers anticipate for period t+1. Notice that in
the T-period model the true price in period t+1 will be a function of the state of
the market vt, the true discount factor ±, the perceived discount factor ±
0 and the
discount factor of the monopolist °. We can thus write the true period t+1 price
as pt+1(vt;±;±
0;°). Being good game theorists, consumers will correctly calculate
this function pt+1(vt;±;±
0;°), but because they are time inconsistent they will set
the true and the perceived discount factors equal. Then, in period t the price




discrepancy between the true and the anticipated price arises, because in period
t consumers think that the constraint of the monopolist’s problem in period t+1
will be







rather than the correct one given by





Using the same inductive arguments as in the 3-period model, one can prove
the following result for the eﬀect of time inconsistency on proﬁts and the path of
prices.
Proposition 8. Consider the t-period model under naive backwards induction.
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0 > 0), and as a result fewer consumers buy in
period 1.
An argument identical to the one we presented earlier, during our discussion
for the equilibrium of the T-period model, shows that in the subgames that follow
time inconsistency will increase the valuations of all marginal consumers. The
eﬀect of time inconsistency on future prices is ambiguous, with the exception of
the prices in the last two periods, which unambiguously increase as the degree of
time inconsistency rises.
Finally, with NBI we can use the recursive structure of the problem to obtain
a closed form solution for the NBI prices and valuations of marginal consumers.
12Alternatively, in a NBI outcome we can assume that consumers erroneously think that
the monopolist will also be time inconsistent. If, for example, it is common knowledge that
consumers and the monopolist are (and will always be) equally patient, in period t consumers
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26Proposition 9. Under naive backwards induction, the sequence of prices, fptgT
t=1,
and the sequence of valuations of marginal consumers, fvtgT
t=1, evolve as follows.
pt = vt¡1At (22)
vt = vt¡1Bt (23)
At =
¡
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In ﬁgure 3 we plot the path of prices with time consistent and time inconsistent
consumers, when there are T = 10 periods and the discount factors are ± = ° =
0:9;±
0 = 0:99. The prices in the ﬁrst two periods are higher when consumers are
time consistent (or equivalently sophisticated-time-inconsistent). However, prices
in the subsequent periods are higher when consumers are naive-time-inconsistent.
In both cases, prices fall to marginal cost (as the Coase conjecture predicts), but
the price path is ﬂatter with naive-time-inconsistent consumers.
5 Equilibrium versus NBI in games with naive-
time-inconsistent players
In this section, we discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages of the equi-
librium and naive backwards induction.
As we have seen, the two notions of equilibrium and NBI are the natural ex-
tensions of the SPNE and backwards induction, respectively, when some players
are time inconsistent. It is well known that in ﬁnite games of perfect information
the SPNE and backwards induction are equivalent. However, from a method-
ological point of view, these solution concepts are very diﬀerent. Recall that in
a Nash equilibrium each player is endowed with some beliefs about how others
will play the game. Each player takes these beliefs as given, without question-
ing how and why others have decided to play as she expects them to. Then,
each player chooses an action that maximizes her expected payoﬀ and in a Nash
equilibrium the players’ original beliefs are conﬁrmed by others’ actions. The
SPNE is a reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium that guarantees that in a dynamic
27game equilibrium actions are also sequentially rational. With backwards induc-
tion players still have some beliefs about how others will play the game, but each
player arrives at these beliefs by putting herself in the shoes of other players who
put themselves in the shoes of other players and so on.
We have shown that with naive-time-inconsistent players the equivalence be-
tween equilibrium and naive backwards induction breaks down. To understand
why, notice that when players are naive-time-inconsistent, they make two types
of mistakes. First, ﬁxing some beliefs about how others play, time inconsistent
players cannot correctly anticipate their own future actions. Second, if a time
inconsistent player erroneously thinks that in the future she will take action x,
when in fact she will take action y, she will also erroneously expect that others
will play a best response to action x, when in fact they will play a best response
to action y. Therefore, time inconsistent players cannot correctly anticipate other
players’ future actions as well. The solution concept of equilibrium renders this
second type of mistake (i.e. incorrect predictions of others’ actions) irrelevant,
because in an equilibrium beliefs about how others will play are exogenous. With
naive backwards induction, beliefs about how others will play are determined by
introspection and this leaves players vulnerable to the second type of mistake (i.e.
not correctly anticipate others’ actions).
A desirable property for a solution concept is that players should be able
to defend their choices with an argument of the form: “I play x, because he will
play y, because I will play z,...”. The game theoretic literature refers to strategies
that can be defended in this way as rationalizable strategies. The strategies that
survive NBI are indeed rationalizable and this is an attractive feature of NBI as
a solution concept. The equilibrium strategies, however, are not rationalizable.
In our pricing problem, for example, if we were to ask consumers to reason about
why the monopolist is charging these particular equilibrium prices, they would
not be able to come up with a consistent story.
Another desirable property for a solution concept, however, is that players
should also be able to defend their choices with a diﬀerent argument of the form:
“I play x, because I think he plays y. In fact, every time he moves he plays
according to y, so my theory that he plays according to y holds water.” This
property is the standard Nash equilibrium requirement that players’ beliefs are
conﬁrmed by the equilibrium actions. Strategies that survive NBI do not satisfy
this property, because players’ theories about what other players will do are
discredited by other players’ actions. By, deﬁnition, the equilibrium strategies,
satisfy this property.13
13Notice that under both solution concepts, as the game evolves over time, the time incon-
sistent players discover that they do not play as they planned they would. This raises the issue
28We believe that choosing between the equilibrium and NBI, as the most appro-
priate solution concept for games with time inconsistent players, should depend
on the particular application we have in mind. In our pricing game for example,
our choice of one over the other solution concept should depend on what we think
is the most realistic way to model how consumers form expectations about future
prices. Suppose that a new electronic gadget goes on the market. Do bound-
edly rational consumers (i.e. real life consumers) form expectations about future
prices by putting themselves in the shoes of the seller? Probably not. Or, do
consumers simply use their past experiences from how this seller, or similar ones,
priced in the past? We believe that the second scenario is more realistic and, as a
result, the equilibrium should be a better predictive tool. In other instances NBI
may be more appropriate. For example, consider a bargaining game or a Cournot
duopoly between two naive-time-inconsistent ﬁrms. In this case, it may be more
realistic to assume that players decide how to play by putting themselves in the
shoes of the other player. In fact, if there are no precedents, players may have
no other way to form beliefs about how others will play and using NBI may be
more appropriate.
6 Conclusion
We solved the inter-temporal pricing problem of a durable good monopolist facing
time inconsistent consumers. In particular, we have shown that as the degree
of time inconsistency rises, monopoly proﬁts fall, prices fall to marginal cost
following a ﬂatter path and consumer welfare falls for all but the highest valuation
consumers.
Before arriving at these conclusions, it was necessary to propose two new
solution concepts for games with time inconsistent players. We have chosen the
terminology of equilibrium and naive backwards induction to highlight the fact
that these concepts are closely related to the SPNE and backwards induction.
Unlike in standard ﬁnite games of perfect information, these solution concept
are not equivalent. Nevertheless, in our price discriminating game they predict
similar qualitative results for proﬁts, consumer welfare and the path of prices.
We hope that the above results contribute to the economic literature in two
ways. First, the existing literature has addressed the issue of time inconsistency
only in single-agent decision problems. The price discrimination problem that
our paper addresses is the ﬁrst attempt to introduce time inconsistency in a non-
cooperative game. Second, even though bounded rationality has been embraced
that players may eventually start questioning what they take for granted in the game and they
may eventually become aware of their time inconsistency. We leave this as an open question
for future research.
29by various economics sub-ﬁelds, it was not until very recently that it found its
way into industrial organization. The present paper complements the recent
contributions of Della Vigna and Malmandier (2003) and Gabaix and Laibson
(2003) in spelling out some implications of consumer bounded rationality for
rational ﬁrms.
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317 Appendix
Proof of proposition 2. Consider the 3-period model with time consistent con-
sumers. The seller solves,
max
p1;v1
(x ¡ v1)p1 + °Π2(v1) (28)
subject to v1 ¡ p1 = ±(v1 ¡ p2(v1)) (29)
Substitute in Π2(v1) =
v1





entiation shows that the optimal ﬁrst period price, p1 and the valuation of the
ﬁrst period marginal consumer, v1, are given by
v1 =
8 ¡ 8± ¡ 2° + 2±° + ±3




(8 ¡ 8± ¡ 2° + 2±° + ±3)
2
(4 ¡ 2± ¡ °)(16 ¡ 16± ¡ 8° + 8±° + 2±3 ¡ ±2°)
Moreover, using equations (11)-(13), we can express all subsequent period prices,
p2 and p3, as functions of v1. To verify that this solution is an equilibrium for
the game with time inconsistent consumers and parameters ± and ±
0, we need
to check that the consumer with valuation v1 prefers to buy in period 1 than in
period 3. This is true as long as v1¡p1 ¸ ±±
0(v1¡p3(v1)). Tedious algebra shows




Assume now that the monopolist maximizes (9) subject to (10). Then, the solu-
tion is given by
v1 =




16 ¡ 8± ¡ 8° ¡ 12±±
0 + 6±2±
0 + 4±±










(16 ¡ 8± ¡ 8° ¡ 12±±
0 + 6±2±
0 + 4±±
0° + 4±° ¡ °±2)(4 ¡ 2± ¡ °)
Equations (11)-(13) allow us to express the equilibrium prices p2, p3 and the
marginal consumer valuation v2 as functions of v1. To verify that this is indeed
an equilibrium in the game with time inconsistent consumers, we need to check
that in period 1 the consumer with valuation v1 prefers to buy in period 1 (or
3) than in period 2. This is true as long as v1 ¡ p2 · ±
0(v1 ¡ p3(v1)). Tedious














H. Assume that the pair (vL
1 ;pL
1) solves (9) subject to (10)
when the perceived discount factor is ±
0
L. Similarly, assume that the pair (vH
1 ;pH
1 )




the ﬁrst period price that would leave the consumer with valuation vH indiﬀerent
between buying in period 1 or period 3 provided that a) the perceived discount
factor is ±
0
L and b) from period 2 onwards the monopolist will price optimally.
Notice that in the 3-period model the continuation proﬁt Π2(v1) is not a function
of ±




















Thus, proﬁt is higher when the perceived discount factor is lower. The ﬁrst
inequality holds by revealed preference. The second inequality holds because
pHL
1 > pH
1 (when the perceived discount factor is higher you have to charge a
lower ﬁrst period price to make a consumer with a particular valuation indiﬀerent
between buying in periods 1 and 3).
A useful observation
For the rest of the proofs it will be useful to make the following observation.
Consider the maximization problem
max
v;p




subject to (v ¡ p) = ±±
0
(v ¡ vc1) (31)
where c1 and c2 are some positive constants less than 1, that could depend on
the parameters ± and ±
0. Let Π(x) be the value of the objective function at the
maximum. Then, straightforward diﬀerentiation establishes the following results
for the optimal choices of the variables p and v .
p(x) = xp(1) (32)









Equation (34) is particularly useful because it implies that in our problem the
ﬁrst period price is increasing in a particular parameter if and only if the overall
monopoly proﬁts are increasing in the same parameter.










0 , and by our previous result, both are negative.
To see how the variable v1 changes with the perceived discount factor ±
0, consider
the monopolist’s maximization problem in period 1.
max
v





subject to v ¡ p1 = ±±
0
(v ¡ vp3(1))
Notice how we used equations (32)-(34) to substitute for Π2(v1) and p3(v1). The




















Proof of proposition 5. We mimic the proof for proposition 3 to show that proﬁts




H be two values of the





H. Assume that the pair (vL
1 ;pL
1) solves
(15) subject to (16) when the perceived discount factor is ±
0
L. Similarly, assume
that the pair (vH
1 ;pH




1 be the ﬁrst period price that would leave the consumer with
valuation vH indiﬀerent between buying in period 1 (at price pHL
1 ) or period 2 (at
the incorrect price14 p2(vH;±
0
L)) provided that a) the perceived discount factor
is ±
0
L and b) from period 2 onwards the monopolist will price optimally. Notice
that in the 3-period model the continuation proﬁt Π2(v1) is not a function of ±
0.




















Thus, proﬁt is higher when the perceived discount factor is lower. The ﬁrst
inequality holds by revealed preference. The second inequality holds because
pHL
1 > pH
1 (when the perceived discount factor is higher, consumers think that
the second period price will be lower and you have to charge a lower ﬁrst period
price to make a consumer with a particular valuation indiﬀerent between buying
in periods 1 and 2).
14Recall that the correct price is p2(vH;±).
34Since proﬁts fall as the degree of time inconsistency rises, so does the ﬁrst period
price, by equation (34). To see how the variable v1 changes with the perceived
discount factor ±
0, consider the monopolist’s maximization problem in period 1.
max
v





subject to v ¡ p1 = ±(v ¡ vp2(1;±
0
))
Notice how we used equations (32)-(34) to substitute in for Π2(v1) and p2(v1;±
0).
Straightforward diﬀerentiation shows that the optimal choice for the variable v1
satisﬁes v1(±) = x
1¡±+±p2(1;±)
2¡2±+2±p2(1;±













The proof of proposition 6 is similar and is omitted. (use reverse arguments)










H. Assume that the pair (vL
1 ;pL
1) solves the objective
function in (19) subject to (20) when the perceived discount factor is ±
0
L (and
when t = 1;v0 = x). Similarly, assume that the pair (vH
1 ;pH
1 ) solves (19) subject
to (20) when the perceived discount factor is ±
0
H. Let pHL
1 be the ﬁrst period price
that would leave the consumer with valuation vH indiﬀerent between buying in
period 1 (at price pHL
1 ) or period 2 (at the incorrect price p2(vH;±
0
L)) provided
that a) the perceived discount factor is ±
0
L and b) from period 2 onwards the
monopolist will price optimally.
Unlike in the 3-period model, now the function Π2(v1) is also a function of ±
0.
We know, however, that Π2(v1) is decreasing in the perceived discount factor ±
0
when T = 3. By extension, we also know that the the ﬁrst period price, p1,
is also decreasing in the perceived discount factor ±
0 when T = 3 (by equation
(34)). Assume that the same is true for all T up to K. The following succession


























The ﬁrst inequality holds by revealed preference. The second inequality holds
because pHL
1 > pH













H)) holds by induction. The former statement (pHL
1 > pH
1 )
holds if and only if the second period price that consumers anticipate decreases
when the perceived discount factor increases. This is also true by our induction
hypothesis. These arguments show that proﬁts (and by extension the ﬁrst period
price as well) decrease as the perceived discount factor increases.
35The proof of proposition 7 is similar and we omit it.
Proof of proposition 9. Consider the maximization problem











Diﬀerentiating with respect to the variables v and p yields
v = x




















Under naive backwards induction, in each period t the monopolist solves the pre-
ceding maximization problem, where v = vt, p = pt and c(±;±
0) = pt+1(1;±;±
0;°).
Notice that the price in period t + 1 is given by the function pt+1(1;±;±
0;°),
whereas consumers erroneously think that it is given by pt+1(1;±
0;±
0;°). The
result follows inductively, by inspection.
36373839